SOLUTION: Campbellsville How DHS Should Handle Attacks Discussion

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Cyber Attacks Protecting Generally-known Infrastructure, 1st ed. Chapter 1 Introduction Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All Hues Reserved 1 • Generally-known infrastructure – Refers to the conceal, underlying bestowal and support systems for all large-scale utilitys considered absolutely essential to a nation Chapter 1 – Introduction Introduction • Conventional path to cyber bond not enough • New path demanded – Combining best elements of stout bond techniques delay investigates that countenance conceal, large-scale generally-known services Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 2 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.1 – Generally-known infrastructure cyber and visible onsets 3 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.2 – Differences betwixt small- and large-scale cyber bond 4 • Three fashions of vindictive adversaries Chapter 1 – Introduction National Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks – External adversary – Internal adversary – Supplier adversary Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 5 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.3 – Adversaries and exploitation points in generally-known infrastructure 6 • Three exploitation points Chapter 1 – Introduction National Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks – Separate similarity – Rule administration and ordinary usage – Supply chain Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 7 • Infrastructure threatened by most low bond concerns: – – – – Chapter 1 – Introduction National Cyber Threats, Vulnerabilities, and Attacks Confidentiality Integrity Availability Theft Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 8 • What is a botnet onset? – The separate assembly of confused end-user machines (usually broadband-connected PCs) is used to onset a target. – Sources of onset are sparse and reserved to identify – Five entities that involve botnet onset: botnet operator, botnet controller, assembly of bots, botnot software decline, botnet target Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Botnet Threat 9 • Five entities that involve botnet onset: – – – – – Botnet operator Botnet controller Collection of bots Botnot software decline Botnet target Chapter 1 – Introduction Botnet Threat • Distributed discardment of utility (DDOS) onset: bots create “cyber commerce jam” Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 10 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.4 – Sample DDOS onset from a botnet 11 • Ten basic drawing and exercise doctrines: – – – – – Deception Separation Diversity Commonality Depth – – – – – Chapter 1 – Introduction National Cyber Security Methodology Components Discretion Collection Correlation Awareness Response Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 12 • Deliberately introducing misleading negotiativeity or misnotification for the scope of tricking an adversary Chapter 1 – Introduction Deception – Computer scientists ole this negotiativeity a honey pot • Untruth enables forensic anatomy of intruder activity • The acknowledged use of untruth may be a deterrent to intruders (entire defencelessness may actually be a noose) Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 13 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.5 – Components of an interface delay untruth 14 • Separation involves enforced similarity policy restrictions on users and resources in a computing environment Chapter 1 – Introduction Separation • Most companies use work firewalls, which are complemented by the following: – Authentication and personality management – Logical similarity controls – LAN controls – Firewalls Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 15 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.6 – Firewall enhancements for generally-known infrastructure 16 • Variation is the doctrine of using technology and systems that are intentionally opposed in substantive ways. • Variation distressing to implement Chapter 1 – Introduction Diversity – A unmarried software vendor tends to control the PC operating rule affair landscape – Variation conflicts delay formal goals of simplifying supplier and vendor relationships Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 17 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.7 – Introducing variation to generally-known infrastructure 18 • Consistency involves conformable heed to bond best exercises resisting generally-known infrastructure components • Greatest investigate involves auditing • A generally-known gauge is demanded Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Commonality 19 • Depth involves using multiple bond layers to protect generally-known infrastructure assets • Justification layers are maximized by using a combination of negotiative and procedural controls Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Depth 20 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.8 – Generally-known infrastructure bond through justification in depth 21 • Discretion involves individuals and groups making good decisions to conceal perceptive notification encircling generally-known infrastructure • This is not the corresponding as “bond through obscurity” Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Discretion 22 • Assembly involves automated group of rulekindred notification encircling generally-known infrastructure to enable bond anatomy • Data is regularityed by a bond notification management rule. • Operational investigates Chapter 1 – Introduction Collection – What fashion of notification should be calm? – How plenteous notification should be calm? Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 23 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.9 – Collecting generally-known infrastructure-kindred bond information 24 • Apposition involves a peculiar fashion of anatomy that can be produced on factors kindred to generally-known infrastructure protection Chapter 1 – Introduction Correlation – This fashion of comparison-oriented anatomy is indispensable • Past initiatives interposed real-time apposition of data at diffuse center – Reserved to implement Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 25 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.10 – Generally-known infrastructure highlevel apposition path 26 • Awareness involves an form understanding the differences betwixt observed and ordinary status in generally-known infrastructure • Most consort on the demand for awareness, but how can awareness be achieved? Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Awareness 27 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.11 – Real-time situation awareness regularity career 28 • Repartee involves the selfreliance that regularityes are in situate to rebound to any bond-kindred indicator Chapter 1 – Introduction Response – Indicators should career from the awareness layer • Current exercise in smaller municipal environments of reducing “false positives” by stoppage to confirm disaster is not cheerful for generally-known infrastructure Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved 29 Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Fig. 1.12 – Generally-known infrastructure bond repartee path 30 • • • • Commissions and groups Information sharing Intergenerally-known cooperation Technical and exerciseal costs Copyright © 2012, Elsevier Inc. All hues Reserved Chapter 1 – Introduction Implementing the Principles Nationally 31 ...
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